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Abstract 
This study explores the relationship between an organization’s technology development 
approach (TDA) and its success in winning SBIR Phase 1 competitions. The research posits 
a difference in SBIR Phase 1 success between companies using sustaining and disruptive 
TDA. Companies responding to DARPA SBIR Phase 1 solicitations are surveyed to 
determine their approach to developing technology solutions. A newly developed instrument 
is used to identify disruptive and sustaining TDA. Demographic data, SBIR success, and data 
on TDA are collected. Principal axis factoring was used to identify four orthogonal factors 
related to TDA. The factors were interpreted and a new objective scale was developed to 
measure sustaining TDA. No equivalent scale was developed for disruptive TDA. Correlation 
and regression analyses indicated TDA is a contributing factor in SBIR Phase 1 success. 
Focus on the defense market and company inventiveness as measured by patent activity are 
also predictors. The findings indicate TDA mediates a company’s focus and success at 
winning SBIR Phase 1 contracts. Implications for defense acquisition and disruptive 
innovation are discussed. A new conceptual framework linking focus, capability, 
inventiveness, and TDA with SBIR Phase 1 success is proposed for further research. 
Introduction 
Since the end of World War II, advanced technology has been the foundation of U.S. 
military strategic advantage. The Department of Defense (DoD) consistently invests $60 
billion to $80 billion per year on weapons system research and development to maintain and 
increase the technology advantage (USD(C), 2013; Watts, 2008). These investments dwarf 
similar investments of other industrialized nations; Canada, for example, projects R&D, 
procurement, and operations investment over 20 years equivalent to a single year’s U.S. 
defense budget (Jenkins, Castelli, Cianfarani, Fraser, & Nicholson, 2013). 
The United States is arguably second-to-none in aggressively harvesting the best 
technologies for incorporation into weapons systems, but it comes at a very high price. Most 
of the investment since World War II has been used to refine and produce technologies that 
existed prior to that conflict (Guilmartin, 1994). The conceptual bases of nuclear weapons 
and radar were understood in the 1920s and late 1930s. Rocketry, jet propulsion, radar, and 
aircraft advances were driven by the focused application of improved production and design 
capabilities. The Cold War was the evolutionary pressure for developing the entire nuclear 
industrial base. The R&D focus since that time, enabled by the unique structure of the U.S. 
defense industrial base, has encouraged the continued emphasis on sustaining 
technologies while giving less emphasis to the systematic encouragement and support of 
disruptive technologies. 
Disruptive Innovation 
Disruptive technologies and scenarios have defining attributes (Christensen, 1997). 
Disruptive technologies are existing technologies configured in novel ways or placed in an 
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entirely new architecture. They typically have lower performance in the primary performance 
dimension, but they often are cheaper to implement or operate. They usually have 
performance in secondary areas that make them attractive to an underserved, or new, 
market. Finally, their value network, or supporting supplier and talent infrastructure, is 
smaller and cheaper than the value network of the legacy technology. 
The disruptive scenario is usually one of the disruptive technology making inroads 
into the legacy technology market share at the low end of a market. The cheaper value 
networks of the disruptive technology, coupled with attractive secondary performance 
characteristics, represents a good value proposition to the segment of the market that 
cannot afford the market-leading technology. Christensen (1997) built this scenario from the 
history of the computer disk drive market. As computers became smaller, so did the memory 
disk drives offered by new entrants to the drive market. These new entrants produced 8” 
disk drives for the emergent mini-computer market and, in the process, acquired market 
share from legacy disk drive vendors who had previously been successful in producing 
larger drives. 
This scenario repeated itself with the advent of the personal computers. A new set of 
disk drive vendors successfully marketed the 5 ¼” and 3 ½” drives and eventually displaced 
the 8” drive vendors. In each case, the disruptive disk drive was developed from existing 
technology, initially had diminished performance compared to the legacy technology, and 
had attractive secondary attributes for a new or underserved market. While cost per 
megabyte of storage was higher than for legacy drives, the form factor was an attractive 
feature for the emerging personal computer market. 
Disruptive innovation also operates on the scale of an entire market. The story of 
Eastman Kodak reconfigured the architecture of the entire photography market by 
introducing an existing, but unused, film technology into the camera itself and altering the 
nature of the photofinishing process (Lucas Jr. & Goh, 2009; Utterback, 1995). George 
Eastman replaced the emulsion-covered glass plates of the large format cameras with a 
flexible film that could be rolled up into a cheaply produced box camera—the “Brownie.” His 
company then assumed the task of processing the exposed film, a business move that 
opened up the field of photography to average consumers. This change in the business 
architecture yielded a tremendously attractive performance advantage for the box camera. 
While a large format view camera would always take superior quality pictures, it was only 
available to those with expertise in, and desire to, chemically process the film. The Kodak 
box camera took lower quality photos, but was very accessible to the casual hobbyist. Over 
time, the quality of “casual photo” pictures improved, driving large format photography into a 
niche market. 
A century later the scenario repeated itself in amateur photography. Kodak had 
become locked into their century-old business model to the point where they saw 
themselves as a chemical and film company instead of a company dealing in imaging 
(Lucas & Goh, 2009; Utterback, 1995). Despite owning the seminal patents for digital 
photography, Kodak was slow to develop a digital camera and accompanying business 
model for the digital imaging market. Computer and technology companies such as Sony, 
Canon, and Hewlett-Packard established an early and persistent presence in the market. 
After the mid-1990s, Kodak was unable to carve out a profitable niche and is currently in 
bankruptcy, while still making film for specialized markets. 
Disruptive Innovation and Defense Acquisition 
Literature in defense acquisition emphasizes the need for developing disruptive 
technologies, but often the term is misused when compared to its classical definition. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= = = - 366 - 
Reference to disruptive technology in a military context is often confused with any new 
technology. The disruptive scenario in the military acquisition literature casts disruption as 
neutralizing or frustrating an adversary’s strategic or tactical advantage (Johnson & 
McLaughlin, 2007; Shannon, Yarbrough, & Johnson, 2010). Consequently the searches for 
what are called disruptive technologies and innovations usually address improving 
sustaining technologies in already existing architectures. This fundamental 
misunderstanding of disruptive innovation in the military context hampers the search for truly 
disruptive architectures. 
The famed British Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was frustrated by the relative 
ineffectiveness of British surface combatants in World War I, even though in the 
Dreadnought class of battleships Britain and the Allies had very advanced technology in 
steam turbine propulsion and advanced fire control. Equivalent technology today would be 
termed disruptive, but in reality these advances were extensions of existing technologies. 
The technology was not only easily matched by adversaries, but was ineffective for either 
side, in part because the command and control architecture of naval surface combat had 
changed little since the Napoleonic wars (Brooks, 2007; Hoffman, 2004; Mukunda, 2010). 
Naval warfare in World War I experienced disruption, but not because of any 
advanced technology. The true disruption was in the use of submarines against Allied 
shipping by Germany and the anti-submarine tactics response of the Allies. Germany 
changed the architecture of naval warfare by ceding the high seas to the British surface fleet 
and preying on transatlantic commercial shipping. This tactic was very effective for the first 
two years of the conflict, in part because the British Admiralty did not view protection of 
commercial shipping as part of its mission. In the parlance of disruptive innovation theory, 
this was not part of the “market” in which it wished to engage. By using the submarine, an 
existing technology, in a new role Germany reconfigured the architecture of naval warfare. 
After massive shipping losses, the Allies responded to the new architecture by adapting anti-
submarine tactics and organizing transatlantic convoys for commercial shipping. It is 
interesting to note that the Allied response also used existing technologies, again in a 
different role. 
After World War II the architecture of warfare emphasized production efficiency and 
operational maneuver (Guilmartin, 1994). The acquisition policies and market forces, since 
the 1950s, have favored and promoted sustaining technology development to fit this 
emphasis. The implicit assumption has been that the outcome of future conflicts would again 
be dependent on production and operational maneuver (Guilmartin, 1994; Watts, 2008; 
Watts & Harrison, 2011). The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan signal that this warfare 
architecture may be about to change. 
This trend of searching for disruptive innovations, while actually focusing on and 
funding sustaining technologies is becoming increasingly expensive and arguably 
unsustainable (GAO, 2005, 2006, 2006a, 2006b). Supporting sustaining technologies is 
critical and necessary to maintaining the U.S. technological edge; however, identifying and 
nurturing disruptive innovation in the classic sense of the term could arguably yield solutions 
that are truly innovative and at a lower cost. It is not an either-or choice, but rather one of 
balance in efforts, resources, and focus. This study begins to address the focus by 
characterizing the technology development approach (TDA) of a company as either 
intrinsically sustaining or disruptive, and assessing whether their technology solutions are 
the preferred ones in an acquisition competition. 
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Significance of the Study 
This study examined the technology development approach (TDA) of small 
innovative companies and established a quantitative relationship between TDA and success 
in defense acquisition contracting. Establishing such a relationship is a key indicator of 
whether a company’s TDA addresses a disruptive or sustaining focus in technology 
development in a deliberate and systematic way. Establishing metrics for sustaining and 
disruptive TDA would give defense R&D professionals a significant tool to assess whether a 
company has the potential for producing disruptive technology solutions. 
The results also fill a gap in the development of disruptive innovation theory, that is, 
the lack of predictive effectiveness in the theory itself (Danneels, 2004, 2006; Markides, 
2006; Tellis, 2006). A known weakness in disruptive innovation theory lies in the 
terminology. The term “disruptive” is used to describe an attribute of the technology as well 
as a technology solutions effect on its market. As with defense acquisition, establishing 
objective metrics for sustaining and disruptive TDA begins to separate the technology 
attributes from the market effects. 
Study Overview 
This was a non-experimental, exploratory study designed to identify disruptive and 
sustaining TDA in small innovative companies. Companies participating in the U.S. 
government Small Business Innovative Research/Small Business Technology Transfer 
(SBIR/STTR) program were sampled with a new instrument designed to measure disruptive 
and sustaining TDA (DoD, 2013). The instrument collected primary data on company 
demographics such as total revenues, company age, number of employees, and so forth. It 
also measured company TDA preference through 12 Likert-style statements developed from 
disruptive innovation theory and systems engineering practices. 
The study design posited that TDA would be a primary driver for success in 
competing for SBIR/STTR contracts. The initial concept framework is at Figure 1. 
 
 Initial Study Concept Diagram 
The TDA, either disruptive or sustaining in nature, would be mediated by a 
company’s focus, capacity, invention or inventiveness, and experience. Company focus was 
measured by a company’s revenue from defense contracts. Inventiveness was measured by 
the patent activity of a company. Capacity related to the scientific and technical staff 
employed by a company, and the age of a company was the measure for experience. 
The primary variable TDA is a new construct derived from responses to the Likert-
style statements of the survey instrument. The survey responses were subjected to a 
dimension reduction and potential measurement scales for sustaining and disruptive TDA 
were developed. With a quantified measure of TDA, the demographic data were subjected 
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to a multivariate regression and correlation analysis to determine the relative contributions of 
the independent variables. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study poses two research questions and associated hypotheses: 
RQ1: What is the relationship among the independent variables of TDA, 
company demographics, and the criterion variable of winning Phase 1 SBIR 
defense contracts? 
RQ2: What are the relative contributions of TDA and company demographics 
to winning SBIR Phase 1 contracts? 
The first research question is designed to identify any relationship among the way 
companies develop their technology solutions, the demographic profile of the company, and 
the criterion variable of winning SBIR Phase 1 contracts. The second research question 
attempts to quantify the identified relationships of RQ1. 
The aim of the study is to examine four hypotheses in support of answering the 
research questions: 
H01 There is no significant difference between technology development 
approaches in winning SBIR Phase 1 defense contracts. 
H11 There is a significant difference between technology development 
approaches in winning SBIR Phase 1 defense contracts. 
H02 There is no significant relationship between TDA and the contribution of 
the demographics INVENTION, CAPACITY, FOCUS, and EXPERIENCE of 
companies who win SBIR Phase 1 defense contracts. 
H12 There is a significant relationship between TDA and the contributions of 
the demographics INVENTION, CAPACITY, FOCUS, and EXPERIENCE of 
companies who win SBIR Phase 1 defense contracts. 
Hypotheses H01 and H11 are designed to determine whether disruptive or sustaining 
TDA are related to success in SBIR Phase 1 competitions. The Hypotheses H02 and H12 
test for the significance of the relationship of TDA with the demographic variables of the 
company. 
Population/Sample 
The target population was small innovative companies engaged in developing 
technology solutions. Companies participating in the SBIR/STTR program were used as a 
surrogate for this population. The regulations for company participation stipulated American 
companies with a staffing of less than 500 (DoD, 2013). The research focused on 
companies competing for SBIR Phase 1 contracts. Technologies at the Phase 1 level 
aligned well with a key attribute of disruptive technologies, that is, technologies that have yet 
to develop a significant value network providing institutional or market support (Christensen, 
1997; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
The sampling frame was developed from companies responding to Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) SBIR Phase 1 solicitations between 2007 
and 2013. This yielded a sampling frame of 462 companies. Companies were randomly 
selected from the sampling frame to participate in the study. Organizations signaling interest 
were sent an information package detailing the study and a copy of the survey instrument. 
Companies wishing to participate were sent an email invitation given them access to the 
survey instrument hosted on the SurveyMonkey.com commercial website. 
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Survey Instrument Validation and Data Collection 
The survey instrument was specially developed for this study. Consequently no 
validity or reliability data were available. Field and pilot tests were conducted to confirm the 
survey’s usability and its reliability. Practitioners in program management and industrial base 
analysts reviewed the survey instrument in a field test and suggested changes in wording to 
improve readability. 
The pilot test involved responses from nine companies selected at random from the 
sampling frame. Of particular interest were the 12 Likert-style survey items measuring TDA. 
These measurements would form the basis for scales measuring disruptive and sustaining 
TDA. Table 1 lists pilot test results with respect to scale reliability of the 12 statements 
measuring TDA. 
Table 1. Item Deletion Effects on Cronbach’s Alpha 
 Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 





if Item Deleted 
TDA15 38.71 51.238 .507 .858 
TDA16 38.00 44.667 .784 .837 
TDA17 38.14 44.476 .717 .842 
TDA18 37.86 51.810 .226 .882 
TDA19 38.00 44.667 .596 .854 
TDA20 37.57 48.286 .634 .849 
TDA21 37.86 40.476 .956 .820 
TDA22 37.57 51.619 .815 .851 
TDA23 38.00 54.000 .270 .869 
TDA24 37.00 55.333 .148 .875 
TDA25 38.14 53.810 .325 .866 
TDA26 37.29 47.238 .861 .838 
The 12 items, TDA15–TDA26, displayed high values of Cronbach alpha when taken 
as a composite scale. Deleting any one item from the scale had minimal effect on the scale 
validity and only depressed the scale to 0.820. This is well above the Cronbach alpha 
standard of 0.7 for valid and reliable scales. No changes were made to the survey 
instrument after the pilot test and the research moved on to the full-scale study. 
A total of 70 companies were randomly selected and contacted from the original 
sampling frame of 420 organizations. Of these 70 companies, 36 expressed interest and 
requested further information. Study details and a copy of the survey were sent with a 
secure email link to the survey instrument. A total of 18 companies completed the survey, 
yielding 16 usable responses. The final response rate for the full-scale study was 22.8%. 
Factor Analysis and Scale Development 
Data analysis was performed in a specific sequence. Descriptive statistics were 
calculated on the demographic and TDA responses. Factors from the TDA data were 
extracted, retained, and interpreted. Potential scales for disruptive and sustaining TDA were 
developed. Finally, new independent variables for TDA were developed from the scales and, 
along with the collected demographic data, were regressed against a company’s success in 
winning SBIR Phase 1 awards. 
Factor Extraction 
The 12 survey items addressing TDA were designed to measure the level of 
sustaining or disruptive TDA of each of the participating companies. The Likert-style 
responses were dimensionally reduced via principal axis factoring and yielded 12 factors. 
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 Scree Plot of Extracted Factors 
The first four factors accounted for ~75% of the variance in the TDA data. Factors 5–
12 displayed relatively little contribution and were judged to be not significant in developing 
metrics for TDA. The four strongest factors were subsequently retained for further analysis. 
The four factor solutions were rotated with a Direct Oblimin transformation to obtain 
optimized loading of the contributing survey items on the identified factors. The structure 
matrix identifies the correlation of the survey items with the four retained factors. 
Table 2. Structure Matrix for TDA 
 Factor 
1 2 3 4 
TDA16 .813 .118 -.074 .537 
TDA21 .774 -.139 -.236 .500 
TDA17 .716 -.243 .206 .037 
TDA15 .617 -.264 -.325 -.238 
TDA19 .508 -.411 -.463 .248 
TDA26 .725 -.783 -.223 -.093 
TDA23 .363 -.708 -.150 .045 
TDA22 -.017 -.607 -.211 -.149 
TDA20 .024 -.529 .388 -.027 
TDA24 .150 .091 .710 .157 
TDA18 -.341 .176 .649 .096 
TDA25 .062 .063 .134 .793 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization 
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Factor Loading 
The survey items highlighted in Table 2 are the highest loading survey items on the 
four retained factors. Best practice with factor analysis is to consider loading item loadings 
above an absolute value of 0.3 to be significant for factor interpretation(R. S. Cooper, 2003; 
Costello & Osborne, 2005; Gorsuch, 1997). At least four survey items load at this or higher 
level on each of the retained factors. Each factor has enough items to form workable scales 
for establishing TDA, subject to interpretation of the factor matrix. 
Factor Interpretation and Scale Reliability 
The highest loading survey items for Factor 1 are characteristic of sustaining TDA. 
Factor 2 loading was associated with survey items describing technology architectures or 
market effects. Factor 3 displays survey items with attributes of both sustaining and 
disruptive TDA as well as significant cross-loading with Factors 1 and 2. The items loading 
strongly on Factor 4 were mostly redundant with Factor 1. 
Sustaining TDA was well described by Factor 1 while Factor 2 showed promise as a 
construct for disruptive TDA. The other two factors were ambiguous; however, scales were 
constructed and analyzed to determine the validity and suitability for including any of the 
factors in the following regression analysis. Table 3 lists the Cronbach alpha for each of the 
four factor scales constructed from the contributing survey items. Table 4 is an analysis of 
the robustness of each scale. 
Table 3. Cronbach Alpha for Prospective Factor Scales  
Factor Cronbach’s Alpha 
Cronbach’s Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items 
1 .833 .833 
2 .727 .730 
3 .448 .522 
4 .762 .752 
N = 4 scale items for each factor 
Table 4. Scale Robustness 
Factor Cronbach’s Alpha Cronbach Alpha Range Item Deletion Sensitivity 
1 .833 .757 – .832 0 
2 .727 .601 – .753 3 
3 .448 .227 – .526 n/a 
4 .762 .532 – .803 2 
Three of the four factors support scales with acceptable alpha values of 0.7, 
suggesting good reliability with scale constituents that are complementary without being 
redundant (Gliem & Gliem, 2003; Gorsuch, 1997; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). The scale for 
Factor 3 falls well below this level, making the factor unsuitable for inclusion in further 
analysis. 
The robustness of the scales is measured by the effect of item deletion. The scale for 
Factor 1 maintains acceptable alpha values regardless of item deletion. Scales for Factors 2 
and 4 indicate fragile reliability; alpha values fall when at least two items of either scale are 
deleted. 
Factor Retention 
Factor 1 is retained for further analysis, based on the homogeneity of the component 
survey items and the robustness of the resultant scale. The scale from Factor 1 is measures 
the construct sTDA, an independent variable used as a measure of sustaining TDA. Factor 
2 is rejected because of its heterogeneous mix of survey items and fragility of the resultant 
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scale (D. R. Cooper & Schindler, 2011; Gorsuch, 1997; Vogt, 2007). Factors 3 and 4 are 
rejected due to inadequate scales in the case of the former and redundancy with Factor 1 in 
the case of the latter. 
Research Questions and Associated Hypotheses 
The research questions were addressed with a mix of correlation and regression 
analyses. The questions RQ1 and the associated hypotheses H01 and H11 explore the 
quantitative relationships among sTDA, the collected demographic data, and success at 
winning SBIR Phase 1 contracts. The question RQ2 and associated hypotheses H02 and 
H12 determine the contributions of the same independent variables and demographics in 
winning SBIR Phase 1 contracts. 
Research Question 1 and Hypotheses H01/H11 
Research Question 1 addresses the relationships among TDA, company 
demographics, and SBIR Phase 1 success: 
RQ1 What is the relationship among the independent variables of TDA, 
company demographics, and the criterion variable of winning Phase 1 SBIR 
defense contracts? 
Correlation among sTDA and the demographic variables successfully addresses this 
question. Table 5 contains a description of the demographic variables and the construct 
sTDA and Table 6 is the resulting correlation matrix. 
Table 5. Demographic Variable Definition 
Variable Name Definition Data Type 
EXP01 Company age (years) ratio 
CAP02 Total employment ratio 
CAP03 Total Science & Technical Staff ratio 
EXP04 SBIR Phase 1 Applications ratio 
EXP05 SBIR Phase1 Awards ratio 
INV06 Patent applications ratio 
INV07 Patents granted ratio 
FOC08 Total annual revenue ratio 
FOC09 SBIR Phase 1 & 2 revenue ratio 
FOC10 Total defense revenue ratio 
sTDA Sustaining Technology Development Approach ratio 
Table 6. Correlation Matrix for Predictor and Criterion Variables 
 
EXP01 CAP02 CAP03 EXP04 EXP05 INV06 INV07 FOC08 FOC09 FOC10 sTDA
EXP01 1           
CAP02 .174 1          
CAP03 .420 .179 1         
EXP04 .474* .074 .791** 1        
EXP05 .626** .253 .776** .802** 1       
INV06 .351 -.027 .568* .753** .601** 1      
INV07 .315 -.004 .621** .601** .441* .807** 1     
FOC08 .291 .407 .623** .701** .581** .588** .520* 1    
FOC09 .405 .374 .678** .351 .737** .237 .218 .285 1   
FOC10 .266 .435* .479* .693** .547* .579** .496* .896** .271 1  
sTDA -.137 .336 .297 .316 .353 .067 .120 .431* .219 .367 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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The criterion variable EXP05 is strongly and significantly correlated with all the 
demographic variables except for CAP02, and displays a weak correlation with sTDA, the 
construct for sustaining technology development. 
The Hypotheses H01 and H11 were designed to measure the difference in sustaining 
and disruptive technology development approaches in SBIR Phase 1 competitions. 
H01 There is no significant difference between technology development 
approaches in winning SBIR Phase 1 defense contracts. 
H11 There is a significant difference between technology development 
approaches in winning SBIR Phase 1 defense contracts. 
While a metric for sustaining TDA was established through factor analysis and scale 
development, no analogous measure could be developed for disruptive TDA. A factor was 
extracted with attributes of disruptive TDA; however, its scale reliability was inadequate to 
properly develop a reliable construct. Consequently, the research could only measure 
sustaining TDA. 
Research Question 2 and Hypotheses H02/H12 
Research question RQ2 attempts to quantify the contribution of company 
demographics and TDA to SBIR Phase 1 success. The hypotheses H02 and H12 are 
designed to determine whether those contributions are significant. 
RQ2 What are the relative contributions of TDA, and company demographics 
to winning SBIR Phase 1 contracts? 
H02 There is no significant relationship between TDA and the contribution of 
the demographics INVENTION, CAPACITY, FOCUS, and EXPERIENCE of 
companies who win SBIR Phase 1 defense contracts. 
H12 There is a significant relationship between TDA and the contributions of 
the demographics INVENTION, CAPACITY, FOCUS, and EXPERIENCE of 
companies who win SBIR Phase 1 defense contracts 
This study regressed the number of SBIR Phase 1 successes against the 
demographic data and sTDA to determine regression coefficients in a standard linear 
regression model: 
05 	 	 	 	 01 	 03 	 06 09   (1) 
The variables used in the regression analysis are listed in Table 7. 
Table 7. Regression Analysis Variable Definition 
Variable Type Definition 
EXP05 Dependent SBIR Phase 1 awards 
sTDA Independent Sustaining TDA 
EXP01 Independent Company age 
CAP03 Independent Science and technical staff 
INV06 Independent Patent applications 
FOC09 Independent Revenue from SBIR Phase 1 and 2 award 
The variables chosen for analysis are a subset of the survey data and represent the 
constructs of focus, inventiveness, experience, capacity, TDA, and SBIR success described 
in the concept diagram of Figure 1. Tables 8 and 9 summarize the results of the regression 
analysis. 
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Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
.932a .869 .803 17.654 .869 13.240 5 10 .000 
Predictors: (Constant), FOC09, STDA, INV06, EXP01, CAP03 
Dependent Variable: EXP05 






t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -53.001 20.952  -2.530 .030
STDA 2.742 1.334 .260 2.056 .067
EXP01 1.362 .535 .349 2.545 .029
CAP03 .645 1.085 .117 .594 .566
INV06 1.821 .886 .302 2.056 .067
FOC09 6.888E-006 .000 .388 2.344 .041
Dependent Variable: EXP05 
The regression model explains ~87% of the variance in the criterion variable of 
success in winning SBIR Phase 1 contracts. Company age and experience, EXP01 and 
FOC09, respectively are the strongest predictors of SBIR Phase 1 success, followed by the 
variables for inventiveness and TDA, INV06 and STDA, respectively. The strongest 
predictors are significant at p < 0.05 level. The coefficients for STDA and INV06 are slightly 
less significant, each with a value of p = 0.067. The construct for capacity, that is, the 
number of science and technical staff represented by CAP03 appears to have the weakest 
predictive value in the regression model. 
Conclusions 
Both research questions and one set of hypotheses were successfully addressed in 
this study. The data successfully addressed RQ1 and established a quantifiable relationship 
among the demographic variables, TDA, and success in competing for SBIR Phase 1 
contracts. The collected data could not address the Hypotheses H01 and H11 designed to 
discern a significant difference in effectiveness in disruptive or sustaining TDA. This was due 
to the fact that disruptive TDA could not be reliably measured. A reliable measurement for 
sustaining TDA, sTDA, was established and used in the analyses for RQ2 and Hypotheses 
H02 and H12. 
The demographic variables representing company experience, focus, inventiveness, 
capacity, and TDA were found to be significant contributors to the success of a company in 
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competing for SBIR Phase 1 contracts. The linear regression model indicates that company 
age and focus on defense projects proved to be the strongest predictors of SBIR Phase 1 
success. Inventiveness and a sustaining TDA were also significant predictors, although at a 
lower level than experience and focus. Capacity, as measured by the number of science 
and technical staff, was found to have minimal, significant contribution to SBIR Phase 1 
success. The results support the initial conceptual framework of Figure 1; however, in the 
following section the discussions and implications for theory indicate ways to improve the 
framework. 
Discussion, Theory Implications, and Recommendations 
The concept framework for this study was developed from the literature describing 
disruptive innovation and architectural configurations. The extant literature strongly indicated 
that differing technology approaches were deliberate choices that manifested themselves in 
the architecture of technology solutions (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2011; R. Henderson, 1993; R. 
M. Henderson & Clark, 1990). This was partially borne out by the study results. The survey 
instrument was able to reliably identify a sustaining TDA among the companies sampled. 
Analyses of the data also successfully quantified the relative contributions of TDA, 
inventiveness, experience, capacity, and focus on winning SBIR Phase 1 contributions. The 
results allow fruitful discussion on the disruptive innovation theory, defense acquisition, and 
technology development strategies in small companies, the concept framework used in this 
study, and the characterization of technology development itself. 
Characterizing TDA 
A failure of this study opened up an unexpected avenue of discussion regarding the 
nature of technology development. The instrument used in this study reliably measured 
sustaining TDA but failed to identify a reliable scale for disruptive TDA. The principal axis 
factoring analysis identified a potential factor that could be characterized as the basis for 
disruptive TDA; however, the component elements were too dissimilar to make for a reliable 
construct. 
The fact that the instrument could discern sustaining TDA and not find a disruptive 
analog raises the question of whether disruptive TDA can be developed as a homogeneous 
construct. The identified variable sTDA displayed homogenous and strongly related 
components, as anticipated from the extant literature (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; R. Henderson, 1993; R. M. Henderson & Clark, 1990). The incoming study 
assumption was that disruptive TDA would show a similar level of homogeneity. The failure 
to do so highlights what the literature usually identifies as a weakness in disruptive 
innovation theory. Instead of a weakness, the results may confirm the heterogeneous nature 
of disruptive TDA as an accurate description of the construct. 
Disruptive innovation theory has been validly criticized as being weak in its predictive 
effectiveness (Danneels, 2004, 2006; Markides, 2006; Sood & Tellis, 2011; Tellis, 2006). A 
measure of this weakness lies in the way the theory was originally articulated. The same 
terminology describes not only an intrinsic attribute of the technology, but also as a way to 
describe market effects. Most of the extant literature focuses on market effects with only a 
few concentrating on finding ex ante indicators of disruptive technology (Christensen, 1997; 
Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006).  
The results of this study support the notion that disruptive TDA may be an alternate 
TDA that is compositionally more diverse than its sustaining TDA analogy. This study 
assumed TDA was a fixed attribute of a company’s technology development strategy. With a 
choice of TDA—sustaining or disruptive—a company could use approaches that best fit 
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technology development requirements. Company development approaches vary from the 
linear and deliberate to less structured and more free-wheeling (Chaffee, 1985; Miles, Snow, 
Meyer, & Coleman, 1978; Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980). Incorporating lessons learned from the 
market in developing technology solutions is a viable strategy in a competitive market 
(Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985; Pascale, 1984). 
Coupled with the relatively weak contribution of TDA to SBIR Phase 1 success it could be 
that TDA is a mediating, rather than primary, driver of SBIR Phase 1 success, and a tool that 
is a mixture of disruptive and sustaining approaches to technology development. 
TDA and Defense Acquisition 
The study results would indicate that sustaining TDA is the preferred approach of 
small innovative companies developing technology solutions. Such a conclusion would be 
consistent with the general direction of defense technology development used by the 
industrial base since the end of World War II (Guilmartin Jr., 1994; Watts, 2008; Watts & 
Harrison, 2011). Sustaining technologies in defense acquisition have large, well-established 
value networks in a market with large barriers to entry (Christensen, 1997; Porter, 1980; 
Porter, 2008). It is also a market that tends to be risk-averse with respect to launching new 
technology architectures that are the essence of disruptive innovation, favoring incremental, 
albeit expensive, expansion of existing architectures primarily because of their existing value 
networks (GAO, 2006, 2006b, 2007; Meier, 2008). 
The notion of TDA being a scenario-specific tool may account for the preponderance 
of sustaining TDA in this research. Defense organizations invest their research and 
development funds carefully, even at the SBIR Phase 1 level. Companies competing for 
such funds will be sensitive to how their nascent technology may fit in with the existing value 
network of a prospective customer (Audretsch, 2003; Wallsten, 2000). A complementary 
study to this one would be to control for the wording and scope of the SBIR Phase 1 
solicitations when assessing TDA. 
The preference for sustaining technologies may be at work on the customer side of 
the SBIR Phase 1 process. Representative from defense agencies are used to assess 
Phase 1 proposals for feasibility. This assessment may introduce an element of selection 
bias if assessment agents are conceptually or technically invested in the value networks of 
previously acquired products. Truly disruptive solutions would likely be discounted if they 
represent to big a departure from the state-of-the-practice of the legacy technology. The 
idea of a selection bias is entirely consistent with disruptive innovation theory. Legacy 
solutions with known characteristics and measurable value networks are attractive 
alternatives to the unknowns of new architectural configurations (Christensen, 1997; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Guilmartin, 1994). 
Recognizing this selection bias in defense acquisition means that any disruptive TDA 
would be a relatively small presence related to sustaining TDA. To offset this bias the study 
sampling frame was drawn from DARPA solicitations on the assumption that the 
requirements for the technology solutions would be less defined and conducive to alternate 
technology architectures. Follow-on studies controlling for sampling frame composition may 
be more effective at isolating disruptive TDA. It is encouraging that a factor representing 
disruptive TDA could be isolated, even if it proved unsuitable for further analysis in this 
study. 
Revisiting the Conceptual Framework 
This exploratory study posited a conceptual framework in Figure 1 where TDA was 
the primary driver for SBIR Phase 1 success. The resulting data collection and analysis 
gives an opportunity to review the framework and develop an alternate configuration for 
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follow-on analysis. From the regression analysis it appears that a company’s focus on SBIR 
projects with experience, measured in terms of company age, a mediating variable. 
Inventiveness and sTDA were found to be weaker contributors, with capacity contributing 
very little. 
Two concepts from the discussion of this research suggest a rearrangement of the 
original framework. The first concept is where TDA is actually a supporting tool that is 
flexible in responding to the specifics of a given solicitation. This moves TDA away from 
being a primary factor to being a mediating variable. The second concept is to recognize the 
existence of some assessment bias on the part of organizations in selecting SBIR Phase 1 
proposals. The reworked conceptual framework is found at Figure 3. 
 
 Modified Conceptual Framework 
Focus is now the conceptual anchor for the construct with inventiveness, 
assessment, and experience being the main mediators. The main difference between this 
construct and the initial framework is the roles of TDA and capacity. They are now shown to 
be mediating inventiveness. Capacity was only a weak contribution to the criterion variable 
and in the new framework it is posited to have a more direct relationship to inventiveness. In 
a similar fashion, TDA characterized as a flexible tool would have a more direct effect on 
inventiveness. Science and technical staff would have the opportunity to blend disruptive 
and sustaining approaches to find the best mix in developing technology solutions. 
Assessment is a new, outside factor added to control for the posited assessment bias 
discussed earlier. 
Recommendations for Future Work 
The following recommendations are drawn from the above discussion and noted 
limitations of the study. They are structured to yield a more effective instrument for 
establishing sustaining and disruptive TDA and to increase the applicability to scenarios 
outside the defense context. 
Enhanced sampling. The results of this study are limited in applicability, in part 
because of the relatively small sample of 16 respondents. A much larger sample size of 
100–200 responses is recommended, which would add more confidence and precision in 
the dimension reduction step (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Increasing the sample size is 
perhaps the single most effective measure to clarify the ambiguities surrounding the 
constructs of sustaining and disruptive TDA. 
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A follow-on study would benefit from controlling for technology domains. While not 
examined in this study it is reasonable to assume that technology development of physical 
items may use different TDA than software. The sampled companies varied widely in terms 
of their technology domains. The new conceptual framework of Figure 3 posits TDA as a 
tool mediating inventiveness. A refinement of this research would be to determine if TDA for 
different technology domains could be quantified. 
Survey instrument enhancement. The survey instrument used for this study would 
need to be revisited for a study based on Figure 3. The lessons of this study, particularly in 
regard to defining disruptive TDA, would need to be incorporated to define a more reliable 
construct and scale for disruptive TDA. A new section to measure assessment bias would 
be needed to properly integrate the new assessment construct of the concept framework. 
Exploratory/confirmatory analysis. A new exploratory study should be conducted 
with the new conceptual framework, followed by a confirmatory study. Both should be done 
with a relatively large sample. A confirmatory study should be preceded by the development 
of a quantitative framework through the use of structural equation modeling. 
Expansion to commercial domain. Successful confirmatory analysis would 
enhance the confidence in the concept framework to the point where generalizations could 
be made about TDA in larger companies with a commercial, non-defense focus. In this final 
study the sampling frame is unrestricted. 
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